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This paper establishes the main differences between standard commercial banks and 
the two non-for-profit banks operating in Portugal (Caixa Agrícola – CA – and Caixa 
Económica Montepio Geral – CE-MG). In particular, we find differences in the way funds 
are raised, governance criteria, tax regime, application of profits and attitude towards 
profit. However, CA is more similar to a typical co-operative/mutual bank than CE-MG. 
Both banks have modernized and transformed into modern financial groups offering a 
wide variety of financial products similar to any commercial bank. However, this was not 
enough to avoid an erosion of their market position in terms of credit and deposits. The 
2008 financial crisis’ impact on the profitability of CA was similar to the impact on the in-
dustry average, whereas on CE-MG the impact was milder.
Este artigo procura definir as principais diferenças entre a generalidade dos bancos e os 
dois bancos com atitude não lucrativa que operam no mercado bancário português (Caixa 
Agrícola e Caixa Económica-Montepio Geral). Encontramos diferenças em termos da for-
ma de captar fundos; em termos dos critérios de governação; do regime fiscal; da aplica-
ção dos lucros; e da atitude em relação ao lucro. A Caixa Agrícola opera de forma mais 
próxima dos bancos cooperativos do que a Caixa Económica-Montepio Geral. Ambos os 
bancos têm vindo a modernizar-se e construir grupos financeiros modernos que oferecem 
uma enorme variedade de produtos e serviços financeiros, semelhantes à generalidade 
dos bancos. Contudo, isto não foi suficiente para evitar alguma erosão das suas posições 
no mercado bancário (quer em termos de crédito concedido quer em termos de depósitos 
recebidos). O impacto da crise financeira de 2008 na rendibilidade da Caixa Agrícola foi 
semelhante à média do sector bancário. No caso da Caixa Económica-Montepio Geral, o 
impacto foi menos grave que na média do sector.
RESuMO
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Introduction 
Co-operative banking is an important reality in the EU 15, 
representing around 14% of the loans and deposits of the 
banking industry. Its importance comes not only from the 
numbers but also from its specific business model, which 
has proved to be resilient to crises. Indeed, in the finan-
cial crisis that began in 2008, co-operative banks in Europe 
had a better performance than standard commercial banks 
(EACB, 2010). They had lower losses and write-downs and 
no co-operative bank has been included in nationalisation 
programs or has been declared bankrupt. Such behaviour 
has increased the interest on co-operative banks. 
This article´s main purpose is to improve our under-
standing of the two non-for-profit banks operating in Portu-
gal, Caixa Económica Montepio Geral (CE-MG) and Crédi-
to Agrícola (CA), and the particular role they play in the 
Portuguese banking sector. 
Our study indicates that, in recent years, CA and CE-MG 
have modernized and transformed themselves into modern 
financial groups, offering a wide variety of financial pro-
duc ts similar to any commercial bank. However, this was 
not enough to avoid some erosion of their market position 
in terms of credit and deposits. 
We were also able to identify that CA and CE-MG share 
some important characteristics that distinguish them from 
commercial banks: they are customer owned entities with 
a democratic control by members; they maximize members/
customer value and not exclusively profits; they look for 
contributing to the economic and social development of the 
regions where they operate; they retain a larger share of 
their profits to reinforce capital; they use a larger share of 
profits to promote social development; and they are also 
more business conservative. In general, CA is more similar 
to a typical co-operative/mutual bank than CE-MG, and has 
also better profitability, efficiency and capital indicators. 
On the other hand, in terms of credit growth CE-MG has 
had a better performance than CA. Also, the 2008 financial 
crisis’ impact on the profitability of CA was similar to the 
impact on the industry’s average, whereas the impact was 
milder on CE-MG.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 the Portu-
guese non-for-profit banks are described. Section 2 descri-
bes the distinctive characteristics of co-operative and mutu-
al banks in Europe. In Section 3, we look at the differences 
between non-for-profit banks and profit-oriented commer-
cial banks in the Portuguese banking system. In Section 
4, we describe the recent evolution of non-for-profit banks 
against the background of the Portuguese banking sector 
and the European co-operative banking sector. Finally, Sec-
tion 5 concludes. 
Brief description of the 
Portuguese non-for-profit banks
As we have just seen, there are two non-for-profit banks 
operating in Portugal: Crédito Agrícola (CA) and Montepio 
Geral (MG). Both banks are in the top ten of Portuguese 
banks: MG is the 6th bank in terms of assets and CA is the 
9th. These two banks are non-for-profit in the sense that 
their prime goal is not to maximize profits with the aim of 
distributing them to their owners (like is the case with all 
other banks operating in Portugal, including Caixa Geral 
de Depósitos whose owner is the State). In the case of CA, 
when it does generate profits these are mostly used to in-
crease its capital base. On the other hand, MG gives most of 
its profits to the Association who owns it and the remainder 
is likewise used to increase its capital base. The proprietor 
of MG uses the received profits to support a range of socially 
oriented activities such as nursing homes for the elderly 
and health facilities.
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CA is a co-operative bank originally oriented for credit to 
the primary sector. Co-operative banks are financial enti-
ties that belong to people who are at the same time the 
owners and the customers of their bank. These people are 
named «members».
MG is a bank owned by a mutual association – MG Associ-
ação Mutualista (MG-AM). Mutual associations assist and 
protect their members against several risks, upon payment 
of a regular contribution. In particular, they manage funds 
set up by «quotas» and contributions of their associates, us-
ing them to protect their future-and that of their family 
members-through assistance or monetary compensations.
We next summarize the main features of these two banks.
Crédito Agrícola
The Crédito Agrícola group, or in short CA, is a medium 
sized Portuguese financial group composed by a centralized 
coordinating body (Caixa Central), several local small banks 
(Caixas) and specialized firms. The largest Caixa compris-
es only ten local administrative departments (municípios). 
Both the Caixa Central and the local Caixas have the legal 
form of co-operatives. During the past two decades, Crédito 
Agrícola underwent a process of reorganization whereby a 
network of autonomous local Caixas concentrated on receiv-
ing deposits and making loans preferentially to the primary 
sector was transformed into a medium sized financial group 
offering a wide variety of financial products and services, 
including insurance, mutual funds and consulting servic-
es. The CA group includes companies specialized in supply-
ing services needed by the Caixas, allowing for considerable 
savings for the group. To potentiate this, in 1998, a uni-
fied computer network was created linking the whole group, 
Caixa Central and local Caixas. The existence of the Caixa 
Central also permits exploring scale economies in terms of 
marketing, creating a unified image at the national level. 
Caixa Central is 100% owned by the local Caixas. Its role 
is to work as their guide, to monitor and control their sup-
ply of loans and to represent them in negotiations with 
regulators. There is a system of mutual responsibility be-
tween the Caixa Central and the local Caixas which makes 
possible that the same capital and liquidity legal require-
ments be subject to regulatory control in consolidated terms 
(Caixa Central plus Caixas). This means that some local 
Caixas may not fulfil the legal requirements as long as the 
group as a whole does.  The Caixa Central also manages 
the branches network in the two largest cities, Lisbon and 
Oporto. In 2009, the Caixa Central represented around 15% 
of the financial margin of the overall group (Caixa Central 
plus local Caixas.
The CA system, composed by Caixa Central and local 
Caixas, has a deposits guarantee fund, for which local Cai-
xas have to make larger contributions than a commercial 
bank has to make to the similar fund managed by the Cen-
tral Bank. This ensures that the Crédito Agrícola Guaran-
tee fund has a better coverage than the general fund for 
commercial banks. 
The Crédito Agrícola deposit guarantee fund also has the 
role of offering loans for the financial recovery of local Cai-
xas. This occurred specially between 1991 and 2002, a peri-
od characterized by the restructuring of many local Caixas 
in financial difficulties, which implied the merger of many 
of them. In recent years, the mergers of neighbouring local 
Caixas have been driven more by the search of scale econ-
omies allowing, for example, saving resources in the fulfil-
ment of supervision requirements. 
Originally, the Caixas were created to make loans to 
the agricultural sector and rural communities. To obtain a 
loan, one had to be an Associate of the local Caixa. To be-
come an Associate, one had to pay a very small– symbolic 
– amount, named «quota», and to develop activities related 
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to the primary sector, including agriculture, forestry, cattle 
rai sing, hunting, fishing, aquaculture, agro-tourism, hand-
icraft, extractive industries, as well as service activities 
linked to the primary sector such as the commercialization 
of agricultural goods and agricultural inputs. Nowadays, the 
criteria to become an Associate of a local Caixa are less strin-
gent, allowing almost everybody to become an Associate. 
Since 2009, the local Caixas are allowed to supply to 
their Associates most of the financial services that a stand-
ard bank is allowed to supply. The local Caixas can also 
supply credit to non-members up to 35% of their assets (or 
up to 50% upon authorization of the Caixa Central). So, al-
though credit to the primary sector is their main vocation, 
the local Caixas can supply any type of loan or other finan-
cial product to almost any type of customer.
Crédito Agrícola’s main strength is its deep knowledge 
of local rural communities and the fact that decision-mak-
ing is faster, because it is made at the local level too. In 
the banking sector, more than in any other sector, knowl-
edge and trust are key factors. Banks need to know and 
trust their customers in order to decide whether or not to 
make loans to them. Individuals and organizations, for 
their part, need to know and trust  their bank before decid-
ing whe ther or not to make deposits in it. Therefore, just 
as big European banks find it difficult to gain share in the 
Portuguese banking market – because of matters of knowl-
edge and trust – so do the big Portuguese banks find it hard 
to compete with CA at the local, rural, level.
In recent years, CA has been trying to apply the same 
knowledge and proximity-based strategy to companies and 
households in urban centres. Local families, local trade and 
small companies are the main target. Success in this is dif-
ficult to measure, but we hypothesise that this strategy has 
been more successful in small urban centres.  
Montepio Geral 
Montepio Geral – Associação Mutualista (MG-AM) is a mu-
tual association established in Portugal since 1840. It is a 
private non-for-profit entity that seeks the development of 
social protections schemes and health and social facilities 
in order to improve the quality of life of its members-mutu-
al associates – which have to make a regular contribution 
to the association. In 1974, it was recognized by the Portu-
guese government as a Private Social Solidarity Institution 
(PSSI) and, as such, it pursues mutual aid in the interest of 
its members, developing an effective response at the level 
of solidarity and complementarity with the public systems 
of health and social security. MG-AM owns the bank Caixa 
Económica – Montepio Geral (CE-MG). 
The associates of MG-AM have a set of advantages. At the 
level of social protection schemes, the MG-AM offers, with 
special conditions in relation to non-associates, mutual prod-
ucts, which are essentially saving and retirement products, 
health and life insurance. These products offered through CE-
MG and other group’ firms may receive an additional return, 
depending on the results of MG-AM, as decided by the annual 
General Assembly of associates. Associates also have access 
to loans given by MG-AM itself as long as they are supported 
by the capital and mathematical reserves of their own saving 
and insurance products. Besides, the associates benefit from 
special conditions, namely better interest rates in credit for 
home purchase and personal credit given by the CE-MG.
Simultaneously, there is a common Solidarity Fund, con-
stituted through small voluntary individual contributions, 
which protects the members and their families in the event 
of death or disease. The association also owns nursery homes 
for the elderly and provides home support to elderly associ-
ates. There is also the promotion of initiatives contributing 
to the cultural and social development of employees and mu-
tual associates, such as the organization of trips, courses, 
conferences, and competitions. 
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MG-AM also has an important role towards non-associates. 
Regarding health and social facilities, examples of social 
aid given by the Association are the donations in areas like 
health, social solidarity, education and training in cases 
where a substantial degree of exclusion and social vulner-
ability are identified. 
Simultaneously, MG-AM has been participating increas-
ingly in community programmes and lines agreed upon with 
different government bodies (such as the ADENE, IAPMEI, 
BEI, IEFP, REAPN, and others), under which it has support-
ed investments in industry, services, tourism, energy and in-
frastructures. This aims to create the right conditions for the 
country’s sectorial and regional economic development, for 
job creation and, on a smaller scale, stimulates entrepreneur-
ship and the creation of self-employment for the jobless. 
MG-AM’s stake in partnerships and agreements focused 
on Small and Medium Enterprises and social economy in-
stitutions is a proof of the importance that it lends to ini-
tiatives promoting citizenship, social inclusion, innovation 
and entrepreneurship as tools for fostering sustainability 
and integrated development. The values promoted by MG-
AM are altruism, humanism, protectionism, sharing, soli-
darity and fraternity. 
MG-AM is part of União das Mutualidades Portuguesas, 
an association that aggregates about eighty private mutu-
al associations, representing about 44% of the mutual as-
sociations and over 90% of the total Assets of the mutu-
al associations in Portugal. MG-AM is also affiliated with 
the Association International de la Mutualité (AIM), which 
represents most mutual associations of the world, includ-
ing some mutual banks, like Credit Mutuel (in France) or 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (in Italy).
MG-AM is the largest mutual association in the Iberi-
an Peninsula and one of the largest in Europe, with over 
489.000 Associates and €2.8 billion in Assets in the end of 
the first semester of 2011.
In 1844, to help further its activities, MG-AM created the 
bank Caixa Económica de Lisboa, which became the first 
and unique financial institution to operate on a strict mu-
tual basis in Portugal. In 1991, Caixa Económica de Lis-
boa, was renamed to Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
(CE-MG), which is fully owned by MG-AM. CE-MG serves 
the banking needs of the MG-AM members and generates 
funds which are used by MG-AM to develop its activities. 
CE-MG was created essentiality to serve mutualism aims, 
offering mutual banking products, attracting retail sav-
ings, granting credit facilities and offering banking serv-
ices to MG-AM’s members. The mutual products offered by 
CE-MG are essentially saving products, namely for retire-
ment, and health and life insurances. 
Under Portuguese law, CE-MG is a «Caixa Económica », 
which makes it different from other commercial banks. Orig-
inally, this type of bank had a limited range of activities, fo-
cusing in attracting deposits and making housing mortgage 
loans. This justifies why at the end of the twentieth centu-
ry, CE-MG already had a remarkable position in the housing 
and construction credit market. Nevertheless, over the last 
decade, CE- MG, together with its subsidiaries, evolved from 
a pure and specialized mortgage credit institution, into a di-
versified financial group, providing full scale banking prod-
ucts and services to its clients. In parallel, CE-MG started 
a portfolio diversification strategy, aligned with a better fo-
cused risk management, benefiting from the growth of its 
branch network, the launch of an IT modernization program 
and the enlargement of the Montepio Group. The acquisition 
of Finibanco Financial Group in 2010 may give an important 
contribution to develop the differentiation, the diversifica-
tion and the competitive ability of CE-MG. 
CE-MG is a universal retail bank that holds the sixth 
place in the Portuguese banking market and, as financial 
arm of the MG-AM, is absolutely essential in the prolifera-
tion of mutualism, in several ways. Firstly, the CE-MG is the 
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fundamental piece of MG-AM, since it allows the association 
to offer to associates a large range of financial products for 
the protection of savings, social and family risks, and credit 
for the acquisition of homes and further education. 
Secondly, MG-AM tries to recruit CE-MG banking cus-
tomers as mutual associates. To persuade them, it offers not 
only its social and health facilities, but also special pricing 
on CE-MG products. Note that anybody can be a CE-MG 
customer without being a member of MG-AM, but the re-
verse is not allowed. In fact, anyone who wants to become a 
mutual associate of MG-AM must meet all the following re-
quirements: pay the initial registration; pay a monthly fee; 
open a bank account at CE-MG; and subscribe at least one 
mutual banking product.
The CE-MG preferential positioning in the Social Econ-
omy is also important for the promotion of the values of 
solidarity that characterize mutualism. Among the bank’s 
priorities is the support of projects that promote a better 
quality of life for children, youth, elderly and disabled citi-
zens. A good example of that is the provision of microcred-
it, which aims to promote self-employment and social and 
economic inclusion. CE-MG has also a natural understand-
ing with social economy institutions. This is translated in 
the offering of a variety of products and special agreements 
designed for the specific needs of Private Social Solidarity 
Institutions-with specific prices and conditions. These tai-
lor-made products include, for instance, products for the 
management of short-term funding needs or insurance con-
tracts. Despite this specialized offer, the credit to non-for-
profit organizations was in 2007 only 0.1% of the total cred-
it of CE-MG and 0.25% of the credit to firms.  
In the context of fierce competition in the banking sec-
tor, one reason why CE-MG manages to remain attractive 
is the above mentioned facilities and special conditions that 
MG-AM provides to its associates. 
Some differences between 
Caixa Económica-MG and Crédito Agrícola 
From what was said, it is clear that CE-MG and CA share 
some characteristics – which we will describe in more detail 
in the next Section – , but they have also some differences, 
which we describe next. Firstly, MG-AM, using the CE-MG, 
aims to provide to their associates assistance and support 
in a broad sense: human, social, financial, among others. 
Instead, CA is more focused on providing a wide range of fi-
nancial services and products. 
Secondly, CE-MG is not directly owned by MG-AM indi-
vidual associates, but instead by MG-AM itself. In the case 
of Crédito Agrícola, members are both owners and custom-
ers of the bank.
Thirdly, while CE-MG is a bank with a centralized struc-
ture, CA has a pyramidal structure, with local autonomous 
Caixas that are headed by the Caixa Central. 
Finally, when we look at the loans portfolio, we find that 
MG is more specialized in credit to families, while CA is 
more specialized in credit to firms. Indeed, in 2009 credit 
to families represented 67.4% of total credit in the case of 
MG and 50.1% in the case of CA (53.9% for the sector, on av-
erage). In contrast, the credit to firms represented 32.6%, 
50.1% and 46.1% of total credit for MG, CA and the sector, 
respectively (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Composition of credit portfolio in 2009 (%)
   CA  CE-MG Sector
Firms  49.9  32.6  46.1
Families  50.1  67.4  53.9
Mortgages  26.4  58.3  42.9
Source: Associação Portuguesa de Bancos and Banks’ Annual Reports.
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Brief characterization of mutual 
and Co-operative Banks in Europe
In this section, we look at the experience of mutual banks and 
Co-operative banks in Europe. Before entering in the descrip-
tion of co-operative and mutual banking, we describe in gen-
eral the differences between a co-operative and a mutual as-
sociation, following Demers (2008). Both type of organizations 
share many characteristics and seek the mutual aid of its 
members, with the differences being essentially on details. 
A co-operative is an organization owned and democrati-
cally-controlled by its members that looks for meeting spec-
ified common needs. A mutual organization manages dem-
ocratically voluntary insurances for members. They make 
a regular contribution to the mutual fund and in exchange 
receive agreed benefits. 
Co-operatives and mutual organizations share the same 
values: mutual self-help, democracy, equality, equity and 
solidarity. In terms of principles, both organizations are 
based on voluntary and open membership, democratic con-
trol by members and share a concern for the community. 
A distinctive principle of co-operatives is the member’s eco-
nomic participation in organization’s activities. 
In relation to objectives, mutual organizations are more fo-
cused on collectively managing risks, while co-operatives are 
more concentrated in meeting specific member’s needs. Anoth-
er difference is that co-operatives may distribute a patronage 
dividend, while in mutual organizations that does not occur. 
There are other differences between those organizations, 
namely regarding the applicable legislation, regulatory au-
thorities, members’ representation and decision-making proc-
ess. With respect to the latter, in co-operatives the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM) can take decisions on the future of 
the organization, which must be followed by the board of direc-
tors. In contrast, in mutual associations the decision power is 
concentrated in the board of directors, competing to the AGM 
to elect the board and define internal statutes and laws. 
After comparing co-operatives and mutual organizations in
general, next we characterize co-operative and mutual 
banks. When the first of such organizations appeared in the 
XIX century in Germany the purpose was to create an alter-
native both to those with lack of access to financial servic-
es and to those who were being exploited by usurers charg-
ing unbearably high interest rates. Regarding their origins, 
these banks can be grouped in two broad groups. On the 
one hand, some banks have been created to provide credit 
to people of limited income, in which case tend to be more 
specialized in mortgage credit. On the other hand, some of 
those banks have been created to provide credit to a partic-
ular field of activity, with the goal of developing it. Depos-
its were received mainly from members of the profession 
and credit was given mainly to small businesses and firms 
on that activity. 
In the first group are included mainly mutual banks. 
Their original goal was to stimulate savings by individu-
als, through the protection of deposits and the provision of 
an attractive interest rate for depositors. Additionally, they 
also made mortgage loans at affordable rates and other se-
cure investments. 
Mutual banks were built from the start to target a broad 
range of the population, with an emphasis on the protection 
of social risks. On this regard they differ from co-operative 
banks, in which case historically members shared some in-
terests and characteristics like trade, profession or belong-
ing to the same local community. But nowadays, co-opera-
tive banks have evolved from serving a restrict community of 
members with common characteristics, and sometimes spe-
cialized in some types of credits, to large universal banks. 
In the present co-operative banks have a strong presence 
in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.  In oppo-
sition, mutual banks have declined in number and market 
share in the late 20th century, becoming globally less signif-
icant than co-operative banks. 
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From what was said, the historical origins of co-operative 
and mutual banks are slightly different. Nowadays, despite 
some small differences, both type of banks share many 
characteristics, which we describe below (EACB, 2010; 
Fonteyne, 2007).  
Firstly, they are customer owned entities. Co-operative 
and mutual bank members are both owners and customers 
of the bank, with customers having influence over the man-
agement. As a consequence, the first aim of a co-operative 
bank is not to maximise profit, but to provide the best pos-
sible products and services to its members. They focus on 
their members’ needs with a long-term perspective. While 
commercial banks maximize profits, co-operative banks 
maximize members/customers welfare. Profit is a neces-
sary condition to guarantee an institutions’ stability, but it 
is not the main goal (Groeneveld and Sjauw, 2009). In the 
case of non-for-profit banks, the goal is to offer their mem-
bers high quality services at the lowest possible cost. This 
helps explain why co-operative banks usually show a small-
er profitability than commercial banks. However, in West-
ern European countries co-operative banks operate more 
cost efficiently than commercial banks (EACB, 2010).
Secondly, co-operative and mutual banks have demo-
cratic control by members. Co-operative and mutual banks 
are owned and controlled by their members, who democrat-
ically elect the board of directors. Members usually have 
equal voting rights, according to the co-operative principle 
of «one person, one vote». They are characterized by a dem-
ocratic governance scheme, with an involvement of their 
members in decision-making in matters defined by the 
statutes of each bank. A consequence of the specific owner-
ship structure and governance of co-operatives and mutual 
associations is that they are basically immune to a hostile 
takeover by another bank. 
Thirdly, both mutual and co-operative banks tend to have 
a pyramidal structure. At the local level, the local banks 
control the various branches; at the national level, there 
is an organization that acts as a bank of the local organi-
zations, offering clearing facilities, pooling funds to lend to 
local banks, sharing back-office functions, like a payment 
system. In some countries, like France, there is an interme-
diary regional level. 
Fourthly, co-operative banks usually have internal de-
posit guarantees schemes. They have institutional protec-
tion schemes that amount to solidarity between local inde-
pendent banks. This guarantees the deposits of members 
in case of failure of one local bank. Some local co-operative 
banks have a small dimension, which may inspire in cli-
ents less confidence on their financial stability, especially 
in times of crisis. However, this is mitigated by the solidar-
ity network between local co-operatives. 
Fifthly, profit allocation is different from commercial 
banks. In a co-operative bank, a significant part of the yearly 
profit is usually allocated to constitute reserves. This helps 
explain why they are well capitalized in general. A part of 
their profit can also be distributed to the co-operative mem-
bers, with legal or statutory limitations in most cases. Profit 
is usually allocated to members either through the use of the 
co-operative’s products and services, or through an interest 
or a dividend, which is related to the number of shares sub-
scribed by each member.
Sixthly, co-operative and mutual banks are predominant-
ly domestically and retail oriented and they are strongly at-
tached to the local economies. Their clients are typically in-
dividuals, households and Small and Medium Enterprises. 
They have dense branch networks that allow them to be close 
to customers. The decision centre is closer to the clients, al-
lowing a better knowledge of the local economy and a faster 
decision process. This together with the democratic process 
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inside the co-operative or mutual association contributes 
for a better satisfaction and trust of clients. Non-for-prof-
it banks have a strong traditional position in attracting lo-
cal deposits. Sometimes what attracts customers is vicinity 
or the financial stability of those institutions that are seen 
as safer than market-oriented banks. But there are also 
emotional factors associated with different business princi-
ples more focused on non-financial performance indicators. 
Proximity to customers – including physical branches in re-
mote regions –, intervention at the local level and ability to 
work with small profit margins are key features of the Eu-
ropean co-operative and mutual banking model. 
Finally, co-operative and mutual banks tend to be more 
conservative than other banks. They mainly follow the tra-
ditional approach to intermediation characterized by orig-
inate to hold, in detriment of the business model based on 
selling commoditized credits. Another aspect of their con-
servatism is that they tend to have a stronger capital base 
than commercial banks. There are several reasons for this: 
(i) they add a larger portion of profits to reserves because 
of their low pay-out ratio; (ii) they have more limited op-
tions to quickly raise capital; (iii) and in some European 
countries they are subject to tighter legal requirements. It 
can thus be argued that, despite their lower profitability, 
financial co-operatives make a positive contribution to the 
stability of the national financial sectors, because of their 
strong capitalization, more prudent risk management and 
lower returns volatility (Hesse and Cihák, 2007).
Crédito Agrícola and Caixa Económica – 
Montepio Geral compared to commercial banks: 
main characteristics and economic performance
In this section we look at the main dimensions where CA 
and CE-MG differ from standard banks and their impli-
cations on the banks’ economic performance. We start by 
looking at the way capital and funds are raised. Then, we 
look at the banks’ governance and tax regime. Afterwards, 
we examine how profits are allocated. Finally, the attitude 
towards profit and social development is also highlighted.  
The way funds are raised
In standard, non-financial companies, the sources of funds 
available are the following: (1) money injected by the owners 
of the company; (2) retained profits; (3) loans from suppli-
ers; (4) loans obtained by issuing bonds (securitized loans); 
(5) loans obtained from commercial banks (bank loans). The 
money raised using the first two of these sources is called the 
«capital base» of the firm, because it corresponds to the mon-
ey that was put in by the owners of the company plus the 
money generated by the activities of the company itself.
In the case of standard commercial banks, along with 
the previous five , there are two additional sources of fund-
ing available: loans obtained from the central bank and de-
posits made by customers, irrespective of whether it is in 
current accounts or savings accounts. In this regard, CE-
MG and CA are not different from other banks. It is only 
relevant to highlight that in CA, its pyramidal structure as-
signs a special role to the Central Caixa in the financing of 
local Caixas. The Central Caixa accepts deposits from the 
local Caixas and deposits from clients. On the other hand, 
the Central Caixa has access to interbank markets and fi-
nancial markets in general (which are not accessible to the 
local Caixas. The money raised in this way and received 
from local Caixas with surplus, can be used to finance local 
Caixas with a deficit of money.
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Comparing with standard commercial banks, the two non-
for-profit banks under study present a ratio deposits-to-lia-
bilities considerably larger than the sector’s average, show-
ing their strong position in raising funds through deposits 
(Table 2). This is one reason why CE-MG and CA on aver-
age between 2004 and 2010, had a lower cost of obtaining 
funds (an average financing rate 1.4 p.p. lower than the 
sector’s average-Table 2).
In the turbulent conditions of the market in 2010/11, the 
strong deposits base was a strategic asset, since banks were 
facing difficulties in obtaining funds in the interbank and 
other financial markets. Note that CA’s deposits have been 
under attack by other banks, as shown by the fact that in 
2010 the deposits of CA have decreased 1.3% against an in-
crease in the sector of 3.9% (Table 2). 
Next, let us focus on the way the non-for-profit banks 
raise capital. Since they do not issue shares in the stock 
market, they only raise funds through the injection of mon-
ey by their owners and by retaining profits. 
Regarding CE-MG, profits are used to increase the capi-
tal base of the bank and to finance the acquisition of other 
financial companies. The MG-AM individual members do 
not contribute directly with capital for the bank. They only 
have an indirect impact on capital through quotas paid to 
MG-AM and subscription of mutual products at CE-MG. 
Turning now to CA, the Caixas can raise capital through 
the admission of new members (which have to subscribe at 
least €500 of capital shares), the subscription of addition-
al capital shares by existing members and by incorporating 
reserves (obtained essentially from past profits). 
Table 2 
Average interest rates and deposits (%)
Note: Average loans rate = Interests received / Financial Assets, Average financing rate = Inter-
ests paid / Financial liabilities. Source: authors’ calculation from data of Associação Portuguesa 
de Bancos. 
Regarding the numbers, CA has a much stronger capital 
ratio than the sector’s average: in 2007, the Tier 1-Capital 
ratio was 11.6% for CA and 7% for the sector. By contrast, 
CE-MG does not have a stronger capital base than other 
banks: its Tier 1 Capital ratio was 6.92% in 2007. One rea-
son why CE-MG’s capital ratio was smaller than CA is re-
lated with its stronger credit growth.
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     2004-07   2008-10    2004-10
Deposits /Liabilities
Sector’s average   45.1     41.6     43.6
CA     93.9     86.1     90.6
CE-MG    56.5     55.5     56.1
Average loans rate
Sector’s average   5.3     5.1     5.2
CA     5.4     4.7     5.1
CE-MG    4.5     5.0     4.7
Average financing rate
Sector’s average   3.9     3.9     3.8
CA     2.0     1.9     1.9
CE-MG    2.7     3.4     3.0
Deposits growth rate  2005-07 2008-10 2005-10
Sector’s average   8.6     5.3     6.9
CA     6.5     2.8     4.6
CE-MG    3.7     6.1     4.9
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Governance criteria
We just saw how funds are raised in CA and CE-MG. The 
way the management applies these funds is closely control-
led by the associates, namely in the Caixas, due to their 
small dimension and local presence. Transparency is re-
quired by the associates who follow closely and with inter-
est all activities the bank is involved in. In this, these banks 
differ from standard banks where shareholders are more 
distant from the everyday management decisions. Also, 
in CE-MG and CA the ownership of the bank is dispersed 
through many small owners, whereas in commercial bank 
sometimes there is a more concentrated ownership struc-
ture. In co-operative banks the moral hazard problems be-
tween owners and depositors, and owners and borrowers 
are mitigated since sometimes they are the same person, 
according with Coco and Ferri (2009). The same authors 
suggest that the asymmetry of information in the lending 
process is also reduced by the network of linkages between 
members / borrowers. 
Tax regime
After raising and applying funds, profits are generated and 
taxes have to be paid. Tax regimes applied to CA and CE-
MG are different. On the one hand, CA lost most of the fis-
cal benefits and tax exemptions it benefited from in the past. 
This occurred in parallel with the process of being allowed 
to develop a growing range of activities and supply an in-
creasing number of financial products. Nowadays, CA fiscal 
framework is almost similar to standard commercial banks. 
In contrast, CE-MG’s social role in the development 
and the consolidation of the Social Economy and the Third 
Sector is recognized by the Portuguese government, who 
grants to  it a regime of tax exemption. As a result, CE-MG 
has benefited from an exceptional regime of exemption in 
the payment of some taxes, included the Income Tax, ac-
cording to the Portuguese law (article 8 of the Decree-Law 
119/83, dated February 25th; article 1 of the Law 151/99, 
dated September 14th; and article 10 of the Corporate In-
come Tax Code). This situation has intensified the tensions 
between CE-MG and the other Portuguese banks, who 
claim this creates unfair competition. In the current con-
text of fiscal consolidation, imposed by the international or-
ganizations (IMF, UE and ECB), there are some risks that 
these benefits could end soon.
The way profits are allocated
In accordance with their co-operative and mutual princi-
ples, CE-MG and CA use profits predominantly to increase 
their capital base and promote social activities (the latter is 
more typical of MG than of CA). Only very recently, did CA 
start to use a (small) part of its profits to remunerate mem-
bers’ capital shares. 
The Statutes of Montepio Geral clearly state – in article 
36-that at least 25% of net earnings must be used to in-
crease the capital base of the bank (at least 20% in the form 
of so called «legal reserves» and at least 5% in the form of 
«special reserves»). The remainder – i.e., an amount which 
will tend to be close to 75% of net earnings – is transferred 
to the Association that is the sole owner of the bank. 
Specific proposals regarding the allocation of profits 
are made each year by the Executive Board of the bank 
and must be approved by the MG-AM General Assembly of 
members. This assembly includes all who have been active 
members of the Association for at least the previous two 
years (each member has one vote).
As already mentioned, the Association uses the money 
received from its bank to promote several activities which 
are socially oriented in nature and benefit members and 
sometimes non-members of the Association.  
We can thus say that the end goal of CE-MG is to gener-
ate profits that are partly used to strengthen the bank itself 
but also used to support and promote social activities. 
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Turning now to CA, after the legislative change of 1995, the 
Caixa’s statutes allow the distribution of profits to mem-
bers, but only after compensating eventual negative past 
results and the constitution of compulsory reserves. The 
distribution of profits is done by increasing the value of 
members’ capital shares or increasing their deposits. No-
tice that only in the latter case does money get out from the 
Caixas. Profits not distributed to members are used to re-
inforce the bank’s capital. 
Since 2007, in order to attract more members and be-
cause the minimum capital share of each member was 
raised to €500, a large number of Caixas has distributed 
profits to remunerate capital shares. Sometimes the capi-
tal remuneration assumes the form of interest, since some 
Caixas have raised capital selling capital shares paying in-
terest. Between 2007 and 2009, on average, 3.9% of the prof-
its were distributed to members, and before 2007 there was 
not the practice of remunerating the members’ capital. 
Regarding the Caixa Central, even though it is legally 
possible, it never distributed profits to its capital owners, 
the local Caixas, because all profits have been used to cov-
er past losses linked to capital injections in some problem-
atic local Caixas. 
After strengthening their capital base, CA also uses a 
part of its profits to help social institutions and the devel-
opment of the local economy. For example, CA group has 
distributed around €12.5 million (3.2% of total profits) to 
social institutions, between 2006 and 2009. We may sum-
marize by saying that, in CA around 93% of profits have 
in the past been used to reinforce the capital base. Due to 
this, CA is a very well capitalized bank, having currently a 
«core tier 1» capital ratio of around 12%, well above the le-
gal requirement.
Attitude towards profit and social development
We have seen above that CA and CE-MG apply profits in a 
different way from commercial banks. But the differences 
between them are even deeper, since the two non-for-profit 
banks, unlike commercial banks, do not have as prime ob-
jective to maximize profit. Instead, fulfillment comes from 
strengthening the bank itself; securing the jobs of the peo-
ple who work in it; and contributing to the economic and 
social development of the regions where they operate. They 
work for the community – for their own employees and for 
the consumers and small trade and businesses – not for 
the markets. Therefore, they do not need to pursue spec-
ulative and risky approaches to the banking business. The 
only profits they need are those to increase their capital 
base (whenever necessary or advisable). This allows them 
to work with small profit margins. 
The fact that CA and CE-MG follow a less risky business 
model can be seen in the fact that the two financial institu-
tions are more specialized in retail banking, especially CE-
MG. Indeed, they have a ratio credit-to-assets larger than 
the sector’s average, implying that credit activity is rela-
tively more important for them (Table 3). In other words, 
the assets associated to trading activities and the financial 
assets own until maturity are less important in their bal-
ance sheets than in standard commercial banks. 
Table 3 
Credit-to-assets (%)
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Source: authors’ calculation from data of Associação Portuguesa de Bancos.
Credit / Assets
Sector’s average 62.5  60.8  61.1
CA   71.7  67.6  70.0
CE-MG  87.2  86.4  86.9
    2004-07 2008-10 2004-10
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in inland regions is also related with its deep genetic con-
nection with primary sector activities. Finally, the fact that 
CA is over-represented in inland regions, which have high-




It may be asked if the close connection and knowledge of 
the local economy possessed by CA does translate into a 
better capacity to manage credit risk. It might be argued 
that co-operative banks like CA have an advantage in deal-
ing with asymmetric information that arises from the fact 
that borrowers are often also members and there is a net-
work of linkages between members / borrowers, which facil-
itates the cross monitoring and creates a stigma in case of 
default. In order to confirm if these theoretical arguments 
do effectively translate into an advantage, we looked at the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and observed 
that the non-for-profit banks have a ratio higher than the 
sector’s average, with CA having the worse performance 
on this respect (Table 6). But while from 2006 to 2009 the 
average ratio of the sector has increased 1.5 p.p. and CE-
Incidentally, a less aggressive attitude towards profit gives 
CE-MG and CA an advantage over competitors – because it 
allows them to charge lower prices for the services they pro-
vide. Indeed, when we look at the average loans rate of the 
non-for-profit banks in the last years it has been slightly 
smaller than the sector’s average: 4.7% for MG, 5.1% for CA 
and 5.2% for the sector (Table 2). Please note that this is a 
rough comparison since it does not take into account differ-
ences in credit composition across banks.
Despite the fact that both banks tend to work closely 
with local communities, the two have differences in their re-
gional presence. Compared with CE-MG or other commer-
cial banks, CA has an advantage in serving local economies, 
because it is a decentralized group, where local Caixas have 
autonomy of decision. Regarding the geographic coverage 
of the branch network, CA has a branch share around two 
times its deposit share: in 2010 it was 11.1% and 5.1% re-
spectively (Graph 1 and Table 4). By contrast, CE-MG has a 
branch share similar to its deposit share: in 2010 it was 5.3% 
and 5.1% respectively. It can then be concluded that CA’s 
branch network is much wider, i.e., much closer to the cus-
tomers than CE-MG’s network. The fact that CA has a much 
larger branch network than CE-MG does not imply a smaller 
operational efficiency, as we will see below. 
In addition, CA tends to locate its branches more in inland 
regions (Beja, Bragança, Castelo Branco, Évora, Guarda, 
Portalegre, Vila Real and Viseu) than the other banks (Ta-
ble 5). When we look at the distribution of banks’ branches 
across regions, CA tends to have a proportion of branches 
in inland regions larger than the sector’s average (on aver-
age 2.4 percentage points (p.p.) larger), while CE-MG has 
slightly less representation on those regions than the aver-
age (on average minus 0.5 p.p.). In 250 small villages, a CA 
branch is the only contact that populations have with the 
financial system. Naturally, the over-representation of CA 
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Source: authors’ calculation from data of Associação Portuguesa de Bancos.
    2004         2007           2009 2010
Number of branches
Sector’s average  5312      5977        6186         6240
CA    616      644         682 691
CE-MG   297      300         326 329
Branches market share (%)
CA    11.6      10.8         11.0 11.1
CE-MG   5.6      5.0         5.3  5.3
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MG’s ratio increased 1.4 p.p., CA’s ratio registered a slight 
decrease of 0.2 p.p. This shows that structurally CA has a 
worse position regarding credit quality, but has been able 
to manage credit risk in a more efficient way during the last 
years of economic crisis. Overall, the closer connection of 
CA to local economies does not seem to translate into better 
credit risk’s indicators, probably due to other factors such 
as the characteristic of the local economies in which CA is 
located (more economically depressed regions), or the com-
position of its credit portfolio (credit to more risky firms). It 
is interesting to notice that in CE-MG, Social Institutions 
were in 2007 the group of clients with lower ratio of non-
performing loans: 0.9% that compares with 2.7% for private 
firms (Montepio Geral, 2007). 
Table 5 
Regional distribution of branches in 2009
Table 6 
Ratio of non-performing loans (in %)
Apart from been more connected to the local economies, 
they are also more domestic market oriented, having an in-
ternational presence smaller than other Portuguese banks. 
This makes them more vulnerable to a negative evolution 
of the Portuguese economy. 
Economic and financial performance
When the financial position of CA and CE-MG for the peri-
od 2004-2010 is analyzed, many of the above assertions are 
confirmed, but there is some specificity in each bank. First-
ly, as expected, the non-for-profit banks have a ROE (Re-
turn-on-Equity) smaller than the average of the sector. But 
while the profitability of CA (12.6%) is only slightly smaller 
than the average (13.8%), the profitability of CE-MG is three 
times smaller than the average (6.8%) (Table 7). The low-
er profitability of CE-MG and CA is associated with a low-
er standard deviation of the ROE: 5.6%, 2.2% and 7.1% for 
CA, CE-MG and the sector, respectively. This is an indicator 
that non-for-profit banks have a less risky business model. 
Change Change 
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Inland Regions               CA          CE-MG         Sector                 CA         MG 
Braga                4.3          0.3     1.5             2.8       1.2
Bragança               3.7          0.9     1.4             2.2       0.5
Castelo Branco              3.1          2.8     1.9             1.2       0.9
Évora                5.1 2.1     1.9             3.2       0.2
Guarda               3.8 1.2     1.6             2.2      -0.4
Portalegre               4.0 0.6     1.3             2.7      -0.7
Vila Real               3.8 0.6     2.0             1.8      -1.4
Viseu                6.5 2.1     3.3             3.2      -1.1
Average             -   -               -             2.4      -0.5
Source: authors’ calculation from data of Associação Portuguesa de Bancos. 
Regional distribution 
of  branches (%)      
Difference towards 
the sector (p.p.)
            2006      2007    2008     2009     2006 /09      2008 / 09
Sector’s average      1.7        1.6      2.2        3.2      +1.5 p.p.    +1.0 p.p.
CA          4.7        3.9      4.3        4.6      -0.2           +0.3
CE-MG         2.3        2.3      2.8        3.8      +1.4           +1.1
Note: it includes the credit to firms and families. 
Source: Banks’ annual reports and Boletim Estatístico of the Banco de Portugal.
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Note: 1 – standard deviation in brackets. To compute the ROE and ROA we used the 
results before taxes. The capital Ratio is not the regulatory capital ratio. Cost-to-
income= Operational costs / Banking Product. Source: authors’ calculation from 
data of Associação Portuguesa de Bancos. 
Table 7 
Main financial indicators (%)
The picture is slightly different for the ROA (Return-on-
Assets) (Table 7). CE-MG is still presenting a ROA below 
the average, but CA has a ratio more than two times larg-
er than the sector’s average. However, in 2009 there was 
a sharp decrease in CA’s ROA, which is justified in its An-
nual Report by the decrease in the Euribor. Given that CA 
has traditionally a lending position on the interbank mar-
ket, the decrease in the Euribor meant a strong decline in 
returns. In general, the reason why CA has a ROA larger 
than the sector’s average but a ROE smaller than the sector 
can be found in the fact that its capital ratio is considera-
bly larger than the sector’s ratio. But the same reason does 
not explain why CE-MG has a ROE smaller than the sector, 
since its capital ratio is below the sector’s average. 
Regarding operational efficiency, we found that the cost-
to-income ratio of the two non-for-profit banks is larger 
than the average of commercial banks, with CE-MG pre-
senting lower efficiency than CA. Between 2004-2010, the 
ratio for the sector was 56.5%, for CA was 58.3% and for 
CE-MG 60.9% (Table 7). 
From the previous data, it can be inferred that CE-MG 
and CA, despite the fact that both are non-for-profit banks, 
have a very different position in relation to the sector. 
On the one hand, CA presents some dimensions where it is 
better than standard commercial banks, such as ROA and 
capital ratio, being only slightly less efficient. On the other 
hand, CE-MG seems to be an under-performer on the three 
aspects presented. However, CE-MG has had a better per-
formance than CA in terms of credit growth (Table 9). 
In sum, in line with Ory et al. (2006) for France, our anal-
ysis of the Portuguese non-for-profit banks indicates, espe-
cially regarding the CA, that co-operative and mutual banks 
are not inefficient and condemn to disappear.  
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   2004-07             2008-10           2004-10
ROE
Sector’s average    17.2   9.3        13.8 (7.1) 1
CA      15.9   8.1        12.6 (5.6) 
CE-MG          8.5   4.6        6.8 (2.2)
ROA
Sector’s average      0.7   0.4        0.5 
CA        1.3   0.7         1
CE-MG           0.4   0.2        0.3
Capital Ratio
Sector’s average      5.6   5.5        5.5  
CA        7.9   8.2        8.0   
CE-MG           4.8   5.4        5.0
Cost-to-income
Sector’s average      58.3              54.1        56.5 
CA        56.5              60.7        58.3 
CE-MG           62.6              58.7        60.9
88 89
To finalize, above it was observed that CA has a better posi-
tion than commercial banks regarding some financial indi-
cators, namely concerning the ROA and capital ratio.  It is 
possible to conjecture some reasons why that non-for-profit 
bank has such a financial performance. Firstly, it is located 
in locals where there is less competition and it exist a large 
pool of savings, which allow him to have a large deposit 
base. Secondly, CA is strongly rooted in the local economy 
and society, is closer to customers, has a decentralized and 
democratic decision process, and is seen as a safe institu-
tion. This allows CA to better respond to the preferences of 
local customers and earn their trust, and at the same time 
develops a better understanding of their credit risk. 
Evolution of the non-for-profit 
Portuguese banks’ market position 
Given the distinctive characteristics of CE-MG and CA, it is in-
teresting to ask how have their market position’s evolved over 
time in a context of increasing competition. In Portugal, the 
non-for-profit banks represented, in 2007, 8.6% of the loans 
market, and their market share has decreased 1 p.p. from 
2004 to 2010 (Graph 1). In the EU 15, the loans market share 
of co-operative banks was in 2007 around 13.5%, and has been 
roughly constant between 2004 and 2007 (EACB, 2010). 
In turn, the deposit market share of the Portuguese non-
for-profit banks was in 2007 10.2%, being the co-operative 
banking EU-15 average around 14% (EACB, 2010). In line 
with the evolution in the EU 15, the tendency in Portugal 
was for a decline of the deposits market share of non-for-
profit banks between 2004 and 2010, with a reduction of 1.3 
p.p. The above data indicate an erosion of the market posi-
tion of the non-for-profit banks in Portugal. 
If instead we look at the indicators of profitability, op-
erational efficiency and capital in 2007, CA is positioned 
above the average of the co-operative European banks. 
On the contrary, on that indicators MG presents a worse 
position than similar European banks (Table 8). 
Graph 1 
Deposits and loans market share (%)
Source: authors’ calculation from data of Associação Portuguesa de Bancos. 
Table 8
Portuguese non-for-profit banks 
and the European co-operative banks (2007) - %
 Loans 
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Sources: EU21: European Association of Co-operative Banks. Portuguese data: Associação 
Portuguesa de Bancos, except data on regulatory capital, which is from Banks’ Annual Reports. 
EU 21     0.5 10.4       65.3           8.6   11.0        21.0        18
CA           1.4 17.4       54.1            11.6   14.4        5.5        2.9
CE-MG    0.4 7.5      60.8            6.9   9.4     5.0        5.8
CA + CE - MG           10.5        8.7
Credit 
market 














Finally, during the 2008 financial crisis European co-opera-
tive banks seem to have been less affected than commercial 
banks. In this context it is relevant to ask how the Portuguese 
non-for-profit banks behaved during that crisis. To begin, 
the Portuguese financial system was not significantly 
exposed to toxic investments that loss value during the 2008 
crisis. Consequently, the main impact of the crisis was felt 
through the worsening of the financing conditions of banks, 
higher credit risk and decrease in credit demand. To assess 
the impact of the crisis we will look at the change in p.p. in 
some indicators between the period 2004 / 07 and the period 
2008/10. The overall impact can be assessed using the ROE. 
For CA, this indicator has decreased from 15.9% in 2004/07 
to 8.1% in 2008/10, which is a 7.7 p.p. decrease. For the overall 
banking industry the decrease was rather similar, 7.9 p.p., 
from 17.2% to 9.3%. The CE-MG’s ROE decreased only 3.9 p.p., 
from 8.5% to 4.6%. From here, it can be concluded that the 
2008 financial crisis’ impact on the profitability of CA was 
similar to the impact on the industry average, whereas on 
CE-MG the impact was milder. When we look at the ROA, the 
picture is slightly worse for CA and similar for CE-MG. 
Table 9 
Loans growth rate (%)
Table 10 
The impact of the 2008 financial 
crisis on key financial indicators (p.p.)
In the case of CE-MG, credit growth was 12.6 p.p. lower in 
the period 2008-10 than in the period 2005-07 (Table 9 and 
Table 10). In the case of CA, the decrease was 2.1 p.p (these 
numbers compare with a decrease of 9.3 p.p. for the indus-
try). This seems to indicate that CA has had a smaller re-
duction in the growth of credit than other banks, especially 
if only the year 2008 and 2009 are considered. This indi-
cates an anti-cyclical lending behaviour, typical of a co-o-
perative bank. 
After the 2008 financial crisis there was a strong com-
petition between banks for deposits, in a context were 
funds from financial markets were more difficult to obtain. 
The strong deposits base of CA has been under attack by 
other banks, which explains why in the period 2008/10 the 
growth rate of deposits was 3.7 p.p. lower than in the period 
2005/07, and for the sector the decrease was slightly less: 3.3 
p.p. (Table 10). Surprisingly, CE-MG managed to increase 
the growth rate of deposits during the crisis by 2.4 p.p. As a 
result, in Portugal the overall impact of the crisis on the 
growth rate of deposits of non-for-profit banks was small-
er than on the overall sector, implying that they increased 
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Sector’s average 13.2  3.8  8.4
CA   4.5  2.4  3.4
CE-MG  11.8  -0.8  5.3
2005-07       2008-10      2002-10
Note: Source: authors’ calculation from data of Associação Portuguesa de Bancos.
Note: The change is the average of 2008 / 10 minus the average of 2004/2007. 
For the growth rate of loans and deposits the later period is 2005/07. 
Source: authors’ calculation from data of Associação Portuguesa de Bancos.
Sector’s average     -7.9          -0.29    -0.02          -9.3           -3.3
CA        -7.7           -0.58   +0.26         -2.1           -3.7

















their market share in 0.4 p.p. (Graph 1). The smaller im-
pact of the crisis on the deposits of CE-MG can be seen as 
an indicator that, during the crisis, depositors trusted more 
this bank than on commercial banks.
The trust assigned by clients to non-profit banks, especially 
CE-MG, has had some justification: these banks have strength-
ened their capital base (although slightly) during the crisis, 
while for the entire sector that did not occur (Table 10). 
Regarding the impact of the sovereign debt crisis, it is 
still very early to draw solid conclusions. Nevertheless, non-
for-profit banks have a more conservative investment pol-
icy than commercial banks and, thus, invest more in Por-
tuguese Government debt (normally held until maturity). 
This suggests that CE-MG and CA maybe more exposed to 
a default or debt restructuring by the Portuguese Govern-
ment. Note that, on the other hand, these banks are bene-
fiting from the higher yields offered by Government debt.  
Conclusion
There are two non-for-profit banks operating in Portugal: 
CA and CE-MG. Despite the fact that they have a smaller 
importance in Portugal than similar banks in Europe, they 
are in the 9th and 6th place of the Portuguese ranking, re-
spectively (in terms of assets). CA is a co-operative finan-
cial group composed by a centralized coordinating body and 
several local small banks. CE-MG is the bank of MG Mu-
tual Association, which pursues mutual aid in the inter-
est of its members. Over the last two decades, these two 
banks have modernized and transformed themselves into 
financial groups offering a wide variety of financial prod-
ucts similar to any commercial bank. Both groups are more 
specialized than commercial banks in domestic retail bank-
ing, with CA focusing more on credit to firms and CE-MG 
on credit to households. 
In line with co-operative banks in the UE, CA and CE-MG 
share some important distinctive characteristics: they are 
customer owned entities with a democratic control by mem-
bers; they maximize members / customer value and not ex-
clusively profits; they look for contributing to the economic 
and social development of the regions where they oper-
ate; they retain a larger share of their profits to reinforce 
capital; they use a larger share of profits to promote so-
cial development; and they are more business conservative. 
These features bring them some advantages: allow them to 
charge lower interest rates on loans and give them a strong 
position in raising funds through deposits. 
Since they are not listed in the stock market, they only 
raise capital through the injection of money by new or ex-
isting members and by retaining profits. The fewer options 
to quickly raise capital, the more conservative approach 
to business and the lower payout ratio, implies that CA is 
better capitalized than the sector’s average. However, the 
same is not observed for CE-MG. 
When looking at recent data, non-for-profit banks have 
an ROE mean and standard-deviation smaller than the sec-
tor’s average. However, the ROA of CA is larger than the in-
dustry average. Notice also that both banks are less opera-
tionally efficient than the sector’s average. It seems that CA 
has some strong features comparing to commercial banks, 
such as a larger ROA and capital ratio, being only slight-
ly less operationally efficient. On the other hand, CE-MG 
seems to be an under-performer in terms of ROA, ROE and 
capital ratio. In general, CA is more similar to a typical co-
operative / mutual bank than CE-MG. 
CA is also more strongly connected to the local econo-
my than CE-MG, especially in inland regions, as shown by 
its dense branch network. The closer connection of CA and, 
in less extend, of CE-MG to their clients does not trans-
late in better indicators of credit risk comparing with the 
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industry’s average. However, CA has been able to manage 
credit risk in a more efficient way than the sector’s average 
during the last years of economic crisis. 
The data show an erosion of the market position in terms 
of credit and deposits of the non-for-profit banks in Portu-
gal. The same has occurred in Europe at the level of depos-
its, but not in credit. 
Compared with co-operative European banks, CA is po-
sitioned above the average in terms of profitability, oper-
ational efficiency and capital. On the contrary, on those 
indicators CE-MG presents a worse position than similar 
European banks.
Finally, the 2008 financial crisis’ impact on the profita-
bility of CA was similar to the impact on the industry’s av-
erage, whereas on CE-MG the impact was milder. Moreo-
ver, CA showed during the crisis an anti-cyclical lending 
behaviour, typical of a co-operative bank. Despite the fierce 
competition, deposits of non-for-profit banks have suffered 
less during the crisis (especially CE-MG), probably due to 
the high trust depositors have on these banks. This trust 
was founded is some evidence: these banks have strength-
ened their capital base during the crisis, while the entire 
sector did not do that. 
Some challenges lie ahead for the Portuguese non-for-
profit banks. In more general terms, like in other large Euro-
pean co-operative banks, it is necessary that CE-MG and CA 
find new ways of promoting members’ participation and to 
be in the frontline of the development of a social and respon-
sible consumption, investment and banking (Gijselinckx and 
Develtere, 2008). An independent control of corporate gov-
ernance is also a challenge for the future (Fonteyne, 2007). 
Additionally, co-operative and mutual banks, like com-
mercial banks are faced with a profound economic crisis in 
Portugal, which creates many challenges for the banking 
business. Firstly, they face a deterioration of the quality 
of credit portfolio and an increasing competition for depos-
its. Both CA and MG-CE will have an additional difficulty 
in insulating their returns from the slow growth of domes-
tic credit in the next years, since they have a smaller inter-
national presence than commercial banks. Regarding CA, it 
is well positioned to deal with the stronger capital require-
ments demanded by the new Basel III regulatory frame-
work. This together with its strong deposits base, may al-
low it to increase its credit market share. CA will have also 
to find ways of coping with the increasing desertification of 
the inland regions, where a large share of its business is 
concentrated. In turn, CE-MG needs to explore all the ad-
vantages brought by its recent bank’s acquisition, and ad-
just to the probable loss of tax privileges.
The non-for-profit banks in Portugal, like other Europe-
an co-operative / mutual banks, have special characteristics 
that contribute to the diversity and richness of the banking 
system, which may improve the economic and social impact 
of the banking industry. This issue could be further ana-
lysed in further works. 
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